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AFTERWORDS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
HAZARD
AND A COMMENT ON MARRESE t
Stephen B. Burbank tt
Presenting work-in-progress is risky, not to say hazardous, business. Evidently, some of the risks have been realized here, although
my distinguished commentator has met me on at least part of my
ground. Indeed, he has tried to appropriate a good deal of it as his
own.
A major goal of my work, as the title of my paper suggests, is to
advance the view that, in most interjurisdictional cases, the only putative federal preclusion rules available are rules of federal common
law. Thus, for example, in the federal-state configuration, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not (and cannot validly) provide
preclusion rules, and in the state-federal configuration, the full faith
and credit statute does not choose state preclusion law. Professor
Hazard's comments are confined exclusively to the problem of federal judgments, which includes the first configuration.
In suggesting that my argument proves too much, Professor
Hazard makes a strawman out of an important sub-theme in my
work, namely that "the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to the
circumstances when it is permissible for federal courts to fashion or
apply federal common law."' In observing that "there is nothing in
the Rules of Decision Act stating or implying any.

. .

limitation [to

cases involving state-law based claims]," ' 2 Professor Hazard is simply
agreeing with me. Perhaps together we can persuade the Supreme
Court, whose recent decision confining the Act to diversity cases is
part of the "rough treatment" I referred to.3 I regret that the constraints of a twenty-five minute presentation prevented me from
elaborating the reasons why, under the Rules of Decision Act (as
well as under traditional federal common law analysis), uniform federal preclusion law governs the preclusive effects of a federal judgt
tt
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1 Burbank, IntejurisdictionalPreclusionand Federal Common Law: Toward a GeneralApproach, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 625, 632 (1985).
2 Hazard, Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 643 (1985).
3 Burbank, supra note 1, at 631 & n.30. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2287 n.13 (1983); see also id. at 2295 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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ment adjudicating matters of federal substantive law. 4 They will be
elaborated in the more comprehensive article, of which my paper
forms a tentative summary.
In suggesting that my argument proves too little, Professor
Hazard provides what is lacking in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and most other commentary and cases-a reasoned defense of
the proposition that, on most matters, uniform federal law should
govern the preclusive effects of federal judgments adjudicating matters of state substantive law. In so doing, he expressly rejects a line
of Supreme Court cases that has only recently been affirmed 5 and
relies on others the vitality of which is in dispute, 6 thus confirming a
suggestion made in my paper.7 I applaud this explicitness; indeed,
it is just what my paper calls for.8 Of course, now that all the cards
are on the table, lower federal courts may feel reluctant to apply
uniform federal preclusion rules in this context. They lack the freedom of law professors to overrule the Court. Indeed, even the
Court can be slow to change its ways, as we are reminded by something else Holmes said about Swift v. Tyson in the case from which
Professor Hazard quotes: "I should leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed
• . . but I would not allow it to spread the assumed dominion into
new fields." 9
As to the constructive part of the argument for uniform federal
preclusion rules made by Professor Hazard, it is my position that
some such rules may plausibly be thought to be required, even for
judgments on state law claims, by the federal statutes establishing
the federal courts and vesting them with jurisdiction. The analysis is
a logical consequence of the theory of respect for federal judgments
I advance as an alternative to the full faith and credit statute.10 We
simply disagree as to where fair implication ends and wishful thinking begins.
Professor Hazard asserts that "the question is probably one of
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 631 n.31.
5 See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); see also Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965) (dictum).
6
On Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) as authority for a
general approach, compare Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 H~Av. L. REV. 693, 70718 (1974), with Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the AppropriateDilemma, 91 HAxv. L. REV. 356 (1977). In my view, Herron v. Southern Pac. Co.,
283 U.S. 91 (1931), adds nothing to Byrd in support of Professor Hazard's major
premise.
7 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 636.
8 Id. at 636.
9 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 633; see also id. at 629. Professor Hazard agrees with
me that the full faith and credit statute does not apply to federal judgments. Hazard,
supra note 2, at 642.
4

AFTER WORDS

1985]

661

major premise."" I doubt it, and I certainly do not accept the major premise he imputes to me. I did not rely on Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 12 for a worldview. I did not even rely on it for a reading of the
Rules of Decision Act. My precise point in citing the case was that
the results Professor Hazard deplores find their inspiration not in
that statute but in a "policy of federal jurisdiction" that the Court
has read into the diversity statute.' 3 Until disavowed, this policy
must be confronted when considering federal common law in (but
only in) diversity cases. 14 More generally, whatever one thinks of
the policy, it is not the only obstacle to uniform federal preclusion
rules for judgments on state law claims when one adopts-the closest thing to a major premise in my paper-the view that the federal
preclusion rules are rules of federal common law. 15
Professor Hazard would have us believe that his major premise
has the support of history. But he attributes to the Rules of Decision Act a dichotomy between procedure and substantive law that
other scholars have found lacking.' 6 Moreover, he ignores the historical evidence that, if we insist upon retrojecting a procedure/substance dichotomy, the Supreme Court has chosen to
assimilate preclusion rules to substantive law. 17 Such may be the
wages of writing history in the light of major premises rather than
vice versa. 18 Professor Hazard is no more successful in enlisting pre1938 history as the ally of his position, argued at a high level of
generality, than was Professor Degnan, who sought support in particulars. 19 That does not mean that they are wrong. There were,
after all, some changes made in 1938. But removing history as a
prop does tend to isolate the normative choices those scholars
would have us make; perhaps it also shifts the burden of persuasion,
although precedent may already do that.
There is an apparent paradox in Professor Hazard's view of
preclusion. On the one hand, he admits there is a "good case" for
the proposition that preclusion rules are beyond the Supreme
11

Hazard, supra note 2, at 645.
326 U.S. 99 (1945).

12
13
14

See id. at n.59.

15
16

See id. at 634.
See Hazard, supra note 2, at 645; but see, e.g., Hill, State ProceduralLaw in Federal

See Burbank, supra note 1, at 636.

Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 66 (1955).
17 See Hazard, supra note 2, at 645. But see Burbank, supra note 1, at 630.

18 See Hazard, supra note 2, at 645 ("Taking as a major premise the proposition that
the federal courts are an 'independent system for administering justice,' the following
line of analysis is invited if not compelled ..
"); supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
Elsewhere Professor Hazard asserts: "[Federal] courts have their own judges, their own
procedure, their own bar, their own enforcement auxiliaries, their own tradition, their
own identity." Hazard, supra note 2, at 647. Procedure? Tradition? Since when?
19 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 626.
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Court's rulemaking power under the Enabling Act, 20 presumably
because they would "abridge, enlarge or modify . . . substantive

right[s]." 2' On the other hand, he describes preclusion rules as a
"technical specification," 2 2 akin, I suppose, to the "technical conundrums" with which the Court has been "preoccupied."

23

Law re-

formers have long assured us that procedure is technical, details-in
short, adjective law.2 4 Whatever the accuracy of those labels as to

other matters, only in Wonderland do they describe rules of preclusion. Granting for purposes of argument that the Founders would
have rejected the "Frankfurter thesis," 25 would they have rejected
the holding in Guaranty Trust?26 If not, why would they have regarded statutes of limitations, but not rules of preclusion, as properly to be furnished by state law?2 7 These questions seem to me

more difficult, if we really take the Rules of Decision Act seriously,
than Professor Hazard's questions about "constitutive rules" 28 provided by the Constitution. At least, however, we have begun to
raise, and suggest answers to, the hard questions.

After my paper was delivered, the Supreme Court decided Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons.2 9 In Marrese, it will be
recalled,3 0 the Seventh Circuit precluded a federal antitrust claim
where the plaintiff had previously failed to assert a functionally similar state antitrust claim in state court litigation. 3 1 A plurality of the
court, through Judge Posner, reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 did
not apply and formulated a federal rule of preclusion.3 2 The Court
20

Hazard, supra note 2, at 642.

21

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).

22 Hazard, supra note 2, at 647.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.1015, 1052,
1068 (1982).
25
Hazard, supra note 2, at 644; see also id. at 645.
26 Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 110 (in suit in equity founded on diversity, state statute of limitations barring recovery must be followed).
27 I am assuming that the Founders did not share the limited view of the word
"laws" in the Rules of Decision Act that was taken in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842) and rejected in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Moreover, for these
purposes I need not invoke the Process Acts, as to which see Burbank, supra note 24, at
1036-39.
28 Hazard, supra note 2, at 647.
29 53 U.S.L.W. 4265 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985).
30
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 640.
31
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4265 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985).
32
726 F.2d at 1154. Judge Posner reasoned that § 1738 could not play a role in the
case because there can be no state preclusion law regarding actions that are exclusively
within federal jurisdiction. Id.
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reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration whether the federal action is precluded under Illinois law and,
if so, whether the Sherman Act, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal courts, constitutes an implied partial repeal of section
1738.33
In contrast to the approach to section 1738 taken below by
Judge Posner,3 4 which at least was on the right track, the Court reiterated its erroneous general view that section 1738 "directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which
judgment was rendered. '3 5 In addition, acknowledging that "a
state court will not have occasion to address the specific question
whether a state judgment has issue or claim preclusive effect in a
later action that can be brought only in federal court,"' 3 6 the Court
responded with reasoning that suggests other weaknesses in its approach to section 1738. On the one hand, the Court relied on
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. 7 for a principle of functional
equivalence, "illustrat[ing] that a federal court can apply state rules
of issue preclusion to determine if a matter actually litigated in state
court may be relitigated in a subsequent federal proceeding." 3 8 On
the other hand, the Court blurred any distinction between use of
state law, mediated through a principle of functional equivalence,
and use of federal law. For, in addressing the ChiefJustice's observation that state law would likely be indeterminate on the question
of claim preclusion presented in Marrese,3 9 the Court relied on provisions of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments stating or contemplating an interjurisdictionalsolution that is not, and is not based on, the
40
law of any state.
53 U.S.L.W. at 4268.
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 640-41 n.83; supra note 32. Indeed, the Court misrepresented Judge Posner's opinion for the plurality in the court of appeals. That opinion declined to answer the "unsettled question" of "whether or not section 1738 allows
a federal court to give a state court's judgment a greater preclusive effect than the state
courts themselves would give it...."
726 F.2d at 1154. But see 53 U.S.L.W. at 426768 ("Both the plurality opinion, and the concurring opinion, express the view that
§ 1738 allows a federal court to give a state court judgment greater preclusive effect
than the state courts themselves would give to it.") (citations omitted).
35 Marrese, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4266. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 640.
36
Marrese, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4267.
37 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
38 Marrese, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4267.
39
See id. at 4269 (Burger, CJ., concurring in judgment).
40
See id. at 4267 n.3 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment g and § 26 comment c(1), illustration 2 (1982)). The assumption of an available
court in the same system, made in the former, is a reflex of the interjurisdi'tional rule
stated in the latter. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 comment c(1)
reporter's note. The reporter states:
When the plaintiff, after having lost a state action, seeks relief with respect to the same transaction under a federal statute enforceable only in
33
34
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The ChiefJustice did not go far enough in his concurring opinion in Marrese. He argued that "a fair reading of § 1738 requires
federal courts to look first to general principles of state preclusion
law," 4 1 but that "[i]f state law is simply indeterminate, the concerns
of comity and federalism underlying § 1738 do not come into
play." 4 2 In a case like Marrese, state law is always indeterminate, and
in any event the statute is simply inapplicable. 4 3 Moreover, these
may be cases in which state laws do not "apply" within the meaning
of the Rules of Decision Act.4 4 Finally, whether under the Act or
under traditional federal common law analysis, 45 in cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction federal courts should be free to fashion uniform federal rules of preclusion, adjusting trans-substantive federal
rules to the extent required by the policies of a particular federal
46
statute.
In the Supreme Court's recent cases, the choice seemed to be a
choice between greater (state law) and lesser (federal law) preclusive
effects. The concurrences in Migra v. Warren City School District Board
of Education,4 7 and now in Marrese,48 point in quite the opposite direction. Those who would thank the Court for small favors should
remember that state preclusion law respects federal substantive policies only fortuitously, 4 9 and that when it does not, the Court's repeal analysis, requiring too much of unsuspecting Congresses, is
federal court, it may be argued that he should be held barred especially if
he could have instituted his original suit in federal court. . . . It appears
sounder, however, not to preclude the federal action by the doctrine of
bar, but rather to allow a carry-over decided issue from the state to the
federal action by way of issue preclusion ....
Id. Elsewhere in Marrese, the Court observed:
Even in the event that a party asserting the affirmative defense of claim
preclusion can show that state preclusion rules in some circumstances bar
a claim outside the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the initial judgment, the federal court should first consider whether application of the
state rules would bar the particular federal claim.
53 U.S.L.W. at 4267 (footnote omitted).
41
53 U.S.L.W. at 4269 (Burger, CJ., concurring in judgment).
42 Id.
43
Section 1738 is inapplicable because there can be no subsequent state proceeding in which the same problem of preclusion arises. Burbank, supra note 1, at 639.
44
On this view, the Rules of Decision Act would be inapplicable because there is no
state law on the question. Compare id. at 632.
45 See id. at 631; supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
46
Even if uniform federal rules were not thought required by traditional analysis or
"require[d]" under the Rules of Decision Act, the most nearly analogous state preclusion rules would be altered to the extent that they were hostile to or inconsistent with
federal substantive policies. Cf Burbank, supra note 1, at 638 (federal common law analysis where § 1738 does apply).
47
104 S. Ct. 892, 899 (1984) (White, J., concurring); see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
48 Marrese, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4268 (Burger, CJ., concurring in judgment).
49
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 640 n.80.
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unlikely to save the day, perhaps even in exclusive jurisdiction
cases. 50 I think that there is a better way, one that need not lead to
federal preclusion rules that are disembodied from the substantive
law. 51 It lies in the analysis of these problems as problems of federal
common law.

50 See id. at notes 75-76 and accompanying text. See also Marrese, 53 U.S.L.W. at
4267 (noting that Kremer Court declined to decide exclusive jurisdiction question but
found no exception to § 1738).
51 For an opinion suggestive of a disembodied federal rule approach, were § 1738
not thought to prevent it, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct.
892, 899-900 (1984) (White, J., concurring). It is not clear that the criticism applies with
equal force to the federal rule suggested by the ChiefJustice in Marrese, at least to the
extent that the inquiry whether "a state statute is identical in all material respects with a
federal statute within exclusive federal jurisdiction," 53 U.S.L.W. at 4269, contemplates
a careful analysis of federal statutory policies, including in particular the reasons for the
grant of exclusive jurisdiction, and of the implications of those policies for preclusion
rules.

